

MISCELLANEOUS

G. CLAY SMITH & CO.,
COVINGTON, KY.,
Manufacturers and Dealers in
Fire and Water-proof House




Roofing,
AND
**Cement for Cisterns, Lining Floors and Walls of
Cellars, Granaries, Covering Steamboats,
Railroad Cars, Engine Rooms, Fire
Walls, etc., etc.**

IT will stand the severest test of HEAT, COLD,
FLOOD, or any climate, and will not MELT
OR BE DESTROYED BY FIRE.

The Material can be furnished in parties in the
interior of the State in Barrels for all Domestic pur-
poses. For Cheapness and Durability, it excels all
articles now in use.

ORDERS FROM CITY AND COUNTRY SOLD
QUICKLY AND PROMPTLY FILLED.
For further particulars, apply at the Office of the
undersigned, the Manufactory, or address,
CURRAN C. SMITH, Richmond, Ky.,
G. CLAY SMITH, Covington, Ky.
C. C. POMEROY, Agent. nov8 wty

ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY

Office at Gwin & Owen's Hardware

Store.
G. W. OWEN agent.
STATE OF KENTUCKY, — County, ss.
A STATEMENT respecting the affairs of the
Adams Express Company, made pursuant to a
act of the Legislature of Kentucky, entitled, "A

The business of said company is conducted by nine Managers, whose full names and proper places of residence are as follows, viz:

W. B. DIXMORE, New York, N. Y.

EDWARD S. SANDFORD, Philadelphia, Pa.
SAMUEL M. SHOEMAKER, Baltimore, Md.
GEORGE W. CASS, Pittsburg, Pa.
JAMES M. THOMPSON, Springfield, Mass.
CLAPP SPOONER, Bridgeport, Conn.
JOHNSTON LIVINGSTON, New York, N. Y.
JOHN BINGHAM, Philadelphia, Pa.
RUEL B. KINSLEY, Newport, R. I.

"The persons requested as *ex nihilo* trust are the stockholders of said company, who change from day to day, and of whom it is impossible to make an accurate statement; owing to the frequency of such changes.

"The amount of Capital employed in the business of said Company, in the State of Kentucky, is, however, by the company, to be ascertained and there-

"And we, the subscribers, the managers above named, do hereby agree that legal process served upon any authorized agent of said Company, in said county, shall be deemed and taken as good service upon said Company and ourselves. Witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed our hands this 11th day of April, A. D. 1855.

Wm. B. Dunmore, [L. S.]	Rufus B. Kinsley, [L. S.]
E. S. Sanford, "	Jas. M. Thompson, "
S. M. Shoemaker, "	Clapp Spooner, "
Geo. W. Cass, "	John Bingham, "
J. Livingston, "	

"STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA:
 And it is remembered, that on the eleventh day

April, 1860, before me came George W. Cass, President of the A. L. Express Company, and made on that day a foregoing statement, signed by him, is true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

"G. W. CASS, Pres't

"CITY OF PITTSBURG,
County of Allegheny,
State of Pennsylvania:

Be it remembered, that on the eleventh day of April, A. D. 1856, before me, Ch. McClure, Hays commissioner in the State of Pennsylvania for the State of Kentucky, duly authorized and commissioned by the Governor of Kentucky, and under the authority thereof, to take acknowledgments of deeds there, to be used or recorded thereon, personally appeared George W. Cass, who being sworn according to law

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set
hand and affixed my official seal this day and year
aforesaid.

CH. McCLURE HAYS
Com. for Kentucky in Pennsylvania

STATE OF KENTUCKY, ss.
I, Alexander H. Rennick, Clerk of the Frank
County Court in the State aforesaid, do testify th
the foregoing is a true and complete copy taken fr
the original, this day filed in my office, and that
W. OWEN is the agent of said company.
In testimony whereof, I have hereto set
name as clerk, this 16th day of April, 1856

May 3, 1884

A. H. RENSICK, C. F. C. C.

A SPLENDID ASSORTMENT OF

FANCY ARTICLES

CAN BE OBTAINED AT
DR. MILLS' DRUG STORE.
POMADES FOR THE HAIR,
Of every style and price, at Dr. Mills' Drug store

TOOTH BRUSHES,
A beautiful assortment, at
Dr. MILLS' Drug Store
COMBS,
Of every description and material, at
Dr. MILLS' Drug Store

HAIR BRUSHES,
The largest variety in Frankfort, at
Dr. Mills' Drug Store

ODONTALGIC PREPARATIONS.
Consisting of Tooth Soaps, Tooth Paste, Tooth Pow-
ders, &c. &c.

DOG GRASS BRUSHES.
For Cloth, Velvet, and Bonnet purposes, at
Dr. MILLS' Drug Store

FINE COLOGNE,
 Of every price, of all shapes, colors, sizes, and p
 fumes, at
 Dr. MILLS' Drug Store
 FINE TOILET BOTTLES.
 Beautiful styles of Bohemian, at
 Dr. MILLS' Drug Store

PERFUMERY,
For sale in any quantity, either in bottles suitable
for the toilet, or otherwise, at
Dr. Mills' Drug Store
—
HANDKERCHIEF EXTRACTS.
The genuine Lubin's, as well as a variety of other

make, in new styles, and at all prices, at
Dr. MILLS' Drug Store

EVERYTHING

In the line of Fancy and Toilet articles, that either
Ladies or Gentlemen can desire, at
Dr. MILLS' Drug Store

FRANGIPANNI SACHIELS,
To lay in drawers and perfume clothing, at
Dr. MILL'S Drug Store

SOMETHING NEW!
Daguerreotypes, Ambrotypes, Photo

H. L. GOODWIN,
TAKES pleasure in informing the public that
has returned to Frankfort, and taken the
G. A. Clarke, adjoining the Telegraph Office
and that he would be pleased to wait on those who

ing perfect likenesses of themselves or friends; he
conflent he will be able to please the most astid
in any kind of picturo they may desiro, from a li
size potrait to the smallest Daguerreotype, or a
brotpe. Also, Daguerreotypes of deceased pers
enlarged to the size of Life and Colored in Oil a
satisfaction given.

I am also prepared to make those gems of Pho

The Ivory type, (made only at this Gallery,) acknowledged by all to be the most beautiful style of photographic picture ever presented to the public. Its brilliancy of tone and color, delicacy of finish, correctness of likeness, and durability, it is far superior to the best miniature on Ivory.

CALL AND SEE.
jy3 w&t-wlf

REMOVAL.
L. TOBIN has removed his stock of Groceries to his new house on Lewis street, opposite C. C. Gilbert & Sons Stable, where he is still

He keeps constantly on hand a choice assortment of Sugar, Coffee, Molasses, Spirits, Tobacco, Cigars, Liquors, and everything usually kept in a well stocked grocery establishment, which he proposes to sell as cheap as any other house in the city.

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY
S. I. M. MAJOR, & CO.,
ST. CLAIR ST., OPPOSITE THE COURT-HOUSE.

TERMS.
One copy, per annum, in advance, \$4.00
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1860.
An Extra Session.

Proclamation of the Governor.

As will be seen by the subjoined proclamation, Governor Magoffin has at last determined to call an extra session of the Legislature. His action in the premises will meet the hearty indorsement of the people of all parties. Kentucky cannot with either safety or honor, remain longer a silent and indifferent spectator of the dismemberment of this glorious Union. It is high time that she should take position and speak in an authoritative manner. In view of impending civil war and the dismemberment of the confederacy, peaceably or violently, the cost of convening the Legislature will not be counted or considered. It is enough to know that such a step on the part of our patriotic Executive is not only absolutely necessary, but is demanded by the popular wish as expressed in many unmistakable forms. We do not doubt that the present Legislature will prove itself equal to the emergency. We have confidence in the patriotism and ability of its members, and we look forward hopefully to its action.

Proclamation by the Governor.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the thirteenth Section of the third Article of the Constitution of Kentucky, to convene the General Assembly on extraordinary occasions, at the seat of Government,

I, BERNAB MAGOFFIN, Governor of said Commonwealth, do hereby call upon the Members of the General Assembly to convene at the Capitol, in Frankfort, on the SEVENTEENTH DAY OF JANUARY NEXT, to take into consideration the interests of the Commonwealth as the same may be involved in, or connected with, the present distracted condition of our common country.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and affixed the Seal of the Commonwealth. Done at Frankfort, this 27th day of December, 1860, and in the 69th year of the Commonwealth.

By the Governor: B. MAGOFFIN,
Thos. B. MOSKOW, Jr., Secretary of State.

We publish to-day Judge Muir's decision upon the constitutionality of the Militia Law. It is a sound and able exposition of the law and the constitution and if the case is carried up we have no doubt it will be sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Rev. D. R. Campbell, of Georgetown, will preach in the Baptist Church in this city, to-morrow, (the 30th inst.) at 10 o'clock A. M., and at night.

Prayers for the President in South Carolina—A Rumor Contradicted.
The report that the Episcopal clergy of Charleston had omitted praying for the President is contradicted in a letter to a Washington clergyman from Rev. C. P. Gadsden, of Charleston. In a letter dated Dec. 19th, the day before the State seceded, Mr. Gadsden says:

There is no foundation for the report that any of the clergy of Charleston have omitted praying for the President of the United States. There has been no change whatever made, either in praying for our civil rulers or for Congress. The Bishop has set forth a prayer to be used, in addition, for the Legislature during their session, and one for the Convention. I prayed myself, this morning, (Wednesday,) in the public service, for both President and Congress, and shall do so until the State secedes. The Bishop will then provide for the new order of things, when we shall be no longer one of the United States. However misrepresented in Southern papers, our clergy are all men of law and order.

An Extra Session.

His Excellency, Governor Magoffin, has issued his Proclamation convening the Legislature, in Extraordinary Session, at Frankfort, on the 17th of January next.

In issuing his Proclamation, the Governor has acted in strict accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, and discharged a duty imposed on him by the extraordinary circumstances occurring in various sections of the country, deeply affecting the interests present and future of our beloved Commonwealth. Indeed, many believe that this duty should have been performed at an earlier day; but the Governor has perhaps acted wisely in waiting until there was no longer a doubt as to the policy of the step he has taken, and until longer delay would have been criminal.

The representatives of the people will now have all that concerns Kentucky in this momentous crisis submitted to them; and their action will be decided, as far as anything that can be done may affect it, the position the State is heretofore to occupy in relation to other States; and upon them it will devolve to devise such means as may be possible for the relief of those of our fellow-citizens upon whom the financial crisis and the stagnation of all business falls heaviest.

An extraordinary session of the Legislature is made necessary by the exigencies of the time, and, we repeat, the Governor has but performed his duty in issuing his Proclamation.—*Lou. Cour.*

It will be seen from the subjoined Proclamation that Governor Magoffin has felt it his duty to convene the Legislature in special session at Frankfort on the 17th of January next. In view of the present aspect of affairs, it is heartily concurred in the propriety of this step. May it redound to the honor and welfare of Kentucky and to the safety of our imperiled country.

Lou. Journal.

SWINDLED.—A merchant at Uniontown, Ky., was recently swindled out of \$100 by a fellow who called himself S. Schlessinger, and who sold the man of pelf 50 gross of gutta percha pens (to arrive) for the above sum. Having the money, the fellow took boat and went to Cairo, where the indignant merchant followed him, only to find, however, that he could get no satisfaction, as the laws of Illinois required a gubernatorial requisition before the rascal could be arrested for the swindle.

The Grand Lodge of the Order of Sons Malta meets at Indianapolis on the 9th of January, and will continue in session from day to day until their business is disposed of.

Board at the United States Hotel is only a dollar and a half a day—just a dollar less than other first class houses in Louisville.—*Southern Kentucky Register.*

Public Meeting.

At a meeting of the mechanics and laboring men of the city of Frankfort, on the 28th inst., at the court-house, Col. J. D. Pollard was called to the chair.

At the request of the meeting, John M. Harlan acted as Secretary.

The chair stated the object of the meeting, which was to take some action in regard to the practice which prevailed of allowing the convicts in the Penitentiary to work outside of the prison in the various mechanical employments.

J. W. Shaupon, Richard Gillispie, F. D. Reddish, Hiram Perry, and F. C. Smith, were appointed a committee to prepare and report to the meeting a series of resolutions.

The committee reported the following preamble and resolutions which were adopted, viz:

An intolerable grievance has existed in our midst for a series of years, to which the mechanics and laboring men have submitted with a virtuous patience, until "forbearance ceases to be a virtue." Many of us, as well as our wives and children, have been made poor, and here, for want of work, have our lots been cast. We are striving daily to procure for our families an honest living, and hitherto have done so. But now, owing to the panic and the disturbed condition of affairs, many of us are out of employment, and can get nothing to do. We want bread. While we are idle for the want of work, we see the grievance spoken of in the daily actions of the convicts of the Kentucky Penitentiary, in working without the walls of the prison the convict laborers, who work at prices that honest men cannot compete with them. They have daily employment in business not connected with the prison, and we have none. We have, time and again, remonstrated with the lessees, and have received no satisfaction from them. At the last term of the Frankfort Circuit Court the grand jury found a bill against them.

We believe that convict labor outside the prison walls is in violation of the laws of the State; and further, we know that it is detrimental to the interest of the honest working man; therefore,

Resolved, That we will not submit to such a state of things any longer.

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to wait on Col. Smith, and request him to take all the prisoners that are now at work outside of the prison within the walls of the same, and there keep them, until their respective terms of sentence expire, or they are reprieved; unless said prisoners are brought out for purposes connected with the necessary and proper conduct of said institution.

Resolved, That the city papers be requested to publish these proceedings.

Upon motion, the following resolution was adopted:

Resolved, That the committee heretofore appointed be directed to memorialize the Legislature of Kentucky at its called session to amend the laws in relation to the Kentucky Penitentiary, so as to restrict the use of the convicts outside thereof to purposes connected with the proper conduct of said institution; and that our Senator and Representative be requested to urge such an amendment of the laws now in force as will protect the mechanics of Frankfort from the competition of convict labor.

After some remarks from Messrs. Gillispie and D. M. Bowen, the meeting adjourned.

From Washington.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 27.—The House Select Committee on the Crisis at day rejected Mr. Rice's proposition, which has been under consideration, by a vote of 12 yeas to 10.

All the Republicans and Mr. Davis, of Maryland, voted in the negative. This proposition was for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific—slavery south of it to be protected while in a Territorial condition, but States formed on either side to be admitted into the Union without limitation.

Mr. Bristow offered a proposition.

The proposition of Mr. Nelson is the next in order.

The dispatch from Charleston relative to Major Anderson's movements created intense and feverish excitement in Congress and throughout the city.

Col. Myers and Capt. Donnan, of South Carolina, and Major Wayne, of Georgia, have resigned their offices in the army. The last named will accept the post of Adjutant General of his State.

The Postoffice Department continues to receive resignations of postmasters in South Carolina, who give as their reason that they are out of the Union.

Mr. Adams, of Tenn., has been appointed on the House Committee to investigate the facts connected with the abduction of bonds, in place of Mr. Bovee, resigned. They may hold some of their meetings in New York.

The address, proposing a Convention of the border States in Baltimore, meets with general approval from the Representatives thereof, and has already obtained numerous signatures.

The Administration have received a dispatch to-day relative to Major Anderson's movements. A Cabinet meeting was called, which remained in session for several hours, and adjourned till 8 o'clock this morning.

The South Carolina Commissioners, so far, have received no encouragement as to being received in an official capacity. The most probable report is, that their case will be submitted to Congress, and that they will be apprehended an immediate termination to their business, as they hired private quarters with the privilege of retaining them till the 31st of March.

A printed circular had been issued for a census to-morrow night for the conservative members of Congress, for a consultation on the affairs of the country. One invitation lists members from Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa.

From Charleston.

CHARLESTON, Dec. 26.—The Alabama Convention will have an immense majority in favor of secession.

There are rumors here that several hundred troops are en route for the Charleston forts. Also that Fort Sumter was reinforced on Sunday with marines under the disguise of laborers.

Postal matters continue here as formerly.

Many foreign ships now in port took out their clearance papers before the 20th, and are now loading. Others will probably take clearances under protest.

Many intelligent Carolinians say that it is a difficult matter to untangle the Gordian knot of Union, but, as a last resort, will cut it.

Mr. Brown's resolution this morning was referred to the Committee on the Constitution.

The Convention sat in secret session till half-past four, when it adjourned till 10 o'clock to-morrow.

CHARLESTON, Dec. 27.—The Convention re-assembled this morning. After prayer the journal was read.

The President announced the reason why yesterday's ordinance was not printed in the journal.

Mr. Middleton here moved that the Convention go into secret session immediately.

Mr. Detreville tried to get in a resolution to declare the Government of South Carolina to be unauthorized and requested to take possession of Fort Moultrie, when he was interrupted by the demand that the motion to go into secret session had the precedence.

Experience in our community is daily proclaiming the efficacy of Dr. S. A. Weaver's medicine in curing humors with which so many of our citizens have so long suffered. They are gaining a great reputation all through the country, and they ought to, if they are as good as those who have tried them say they are. We would advise people that are in need of such medicines to give them a trial.

Everybody should know the great value of Dr. S. O. Richardson's Sherry Wine Bitters. If not already enjoying the beneficial effects of its use, lose no time in introducing it into your family; it imparts new life to such as require a stimulating.

Sold by all Druggists.

The Military Court-Martial Case.

WOODRUFF vs. THOS. H. HUNT, et al.
Prohibition.

The defendants, by order of His Excellency, the Governor of Kentucky, Commander in Chief of the State Militia, have been removed to Louisville, and organized as a General Court-Martial, for the trial of the plaintiff upon various charges preferred against him. Upon suggestions in writing, deemed sufficient for their purpose, the defendants were ordered by this court to cease the trial of the plaintiff until his application for a writ of prohibition could be heard. The order was properly obeyed, and the application promptly responded to.

The act of the Legislature, by virtue of which alone authority is claimed for the organization of this court-martial, was approved March 5th, 1860, and is entitled, "An act for the better organization of the Kentucky militia." The plaintiff insists that this act is in violation of the Federal Constitution, and was not passed as required by the Constitution of this State, and is therefore null and void. He also complains that it is in all of its substantial provisions in conflict with the acts of the Federal Congress upon this subject, and is therefore invalid. He further contends that the court-martial has no jurisdiction to try the charges preferred against him.

To all this the defendants have responded that the act is not in violation of the Federal Constitution, and was passed in strict conformity with the Constitution of this State—that it is not in conflict with the acts of Congress—that as a General Court-Martial they have jurisdiction of the charges preferred—and that all of these matters they are the sole and exclusive judges—the only tribunal to which these questions can be properly addressed, and that therefore this court has no power to grant prohibition against them.

The jurisdiction of this court being questioned in the response, and denied in the argument, it behooves me before proceeding further with the motion, to dispose of this objection. In England the writ of prohibition originally emanated only from, or was always returnable before, the court of King's Bench. That court had a general superintendency over all the inferior courts of the kingdom, and was empowered to keep them within the limits prescribed for them, and to prevent the exercise of judicial functions and powers by mere usurpers, this writ was framed. It was always granted to restrain inferior courts from trying causes of which they had no jurisdiction, and also to restrain such persons as assumed, without authority, the office and functions of a court in the trial of cases.

And in England the writ of prohibition was not exercised solely "in virtue of their original jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy," as held by the Court of Appeals in the case of *Reese vs. Lawless*, 13 B. 395. The writ was granted, not because the King's Bench had jurisdiction of the particular subject matter, but rather because the inferior court had not such jurisdiction. It was granted in many cases by that court for the reason that no court had jurisdiction; thus demonstrating that their authority to grant it was not limited to the cases of encroachment upon their jurisdiction. Numerous cases may be found in the English reports to which the writ was applied, where the jurisdiction was not pretended to reside with the court who granted it. It is not true, therefore, that this court has no jurisdiction of the case of *Reese vs. Lawless*, and that the inferior courts existed "in virtue of their original jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy." But it is true, as before shown, that it existed because of the general superintendency of that court over all inferior jurisdictions and in virtue of its power to keep them in their proper sphere. Tomlin's Law, vol. 3, p. 246, and cases there cited.

And this is understood to be the doctrine settled in the case of *Arnold & Parish vs. Shields*, 45, (5th Dan., 20.) It is true that the case of *Reese vs. Lawless* is not there reviewed nor even named, yet the principle settled in the latter is in direct conflict with the former, and it must therefore be considered as overruled. Besides, the case of *Arnold*, &c., vs. *Shields* is sustained by the origin and history of the writ of prohibition, and the preponderance of the English and American cases. The case of *Reese vs. Lawless* is not supported by reason, and is a mere measure of the object for which the writ was framed, and stands almost entirely unsustained by authority. It ought to be, therefore, if it has not been, overruled. It is a principle of the common law that superior courts are entitled to a general superintendency over all inferior courts, and may and may restrain them from the exercise of arrogated jurisdiction. As a means to enforce this principle the writ of prohibition was framed.

Now, courts martial are subordinate and inferior in their jurisdiction to Circuit Courts in this Commonwealth. This, under our Constitution, is too obvious for argument. It has been so since the establishment of the Circuit Court, and since the establishment of the inferior courts, resembles that of the King's Bench to the subordinate tribunals of England. This relation, as we have seen, is one of superiority, from which, as a salutary, if not a necessary principle, the controlling power may be deduced. This controlling power was exercised by the King's Bench in such cases as this by the writ of prohibition, and it is the duty of the Circuit Courts of this State, in the same manner, (Arnold vs. Shields, 5th Dan., 20.)

In confirmation of this view of the subject, the definition of the writ of prohibition furnished by the Legislature may be cited. Sec. 525 of the Civil Code says, "the writ of prohibition is an order from a Circuit Court to an inferior court of limited jurisdiction, prohibiting it from proceeding in matters not within its jurisdiction." The writ would seem to remove all doubt concerning the question of jurisdiction.

2d. The next thing to be considered involves not only the jurisdiction of the court-martial, but its very existence. Is the matter referred to that court "out of its jurisdiction?" The defendants insist that they must be allowed to answer for themselves. On the other hand, the plaintiff insists that the writ they claim to derive their being as a court is null and void, and that therefore the court has no legal or constitutional existence, and that consequently this and all other matters must be "out of its jurisdiction." It will thus be perceived that the answer to this second question necessarily involves an inquiry not only into their right to judge of their own cases, or having tried them, but also into the constitutionality of the act from which their judicial existence is derived.

1st. And first, of the right to judge exclusively of their own jurisdiction. Enough has already been said to prove that this cannot be so. It is at war with the common law principle, which springs from the necessities of government, and is a principle which is as old as the hills. It is a principle which is as old as the hills, and is a principle which is as old as the hills.

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plaintiff. I use the term "jurisdiction" in the sense which would make the judgment void, where it did not exist. For instance, it does not follow that because a claim is void and arises out of an unconstitutional act, it cannot be presented to an inferior court for adjudication. If such court has, by law, jurisdiction of such suits, then its province is to adjudicate the matter presented, and determine whether the claim be valid or void, and whether the act out of which it arises be Constitutional or null and void. In such case the judgment, whether right or wrong, would not be void, and although the act might be unconstitutional, still the writ of prohibition could not be granted in such case before judgment. Whether it could be granted after judgment, where the right of appeal did not exist, it is not necessary now to decide.

But where the act, by virtue of which the court was created, is void, or where the court had no jurisdiction similar to that presented, its judgment would be void, and in such cases the writ of prohibition might be granted. In both instances the matter would be, in the language of the code, "out of its jurisdiction." In this case both the court martial and the proceeding complained of spring from the same act of the Legislature. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine its validity.

2d. The plaintiff insists that it is in violation of the Federal Constitution, and particularly of that part of article 2 of sec. 10 of Art. 1, which provides that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, "keep troops" or ships of war in time of peace unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. The act was passed without the consent of Congress, "in time of peace," and when there was no "invasion," or "imminent danger." And the question is, does it provide for "keeping troops" within the meaning of the Constitution? This prohibition, or limitation, upon the sovereignty of the State has respect to the war-making power, "to the setting on foot of an army" either in actual service or in constant preparation for such service. "Keep troops" means to raise and force and sustain, as soldiers, and armed and ready for service. Such must be their location or they cannot be troops kept by the State. The exceptions made by the constitution show that this is the meaning of the general prohibition. The State is allowed to "keep troops" in case of actual invasion, or when in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Now, in case of actual invasion, to "keep troops" means to raise and force and sustain, as soldiers, and armed and ready for service. Such must be their location or they cannot be troops kept by the State. The exceptions made by the constitution show that this is the meaning of the general prohibition. The State is allowed to "keep troops" in case of actual invasion, or when in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Now, in case of actual invasion, to "keep troops" means to raise and force and sustain, as soldiers, and armed and ready for service. Such must be their location or they cannot be troops kept by the State. The exceptions made by the constitution show that this is the meaning of the general prohibition. 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Mr. Green said his object was to organize a Government for Arizona, and he hoped these discussions of political matters would be postponed. He did not think the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi practically amounted to

Gentlemen: I have just been informed that you did me the honor, by resolution, to invite me to a seat on the floor of the Convention. I am wanting in language, gentlemen, to express my feelings which this very unexpected court say at your hands has given rise to. In the course of my life, now nearly half a century—a life not

go into sequestration. Carried.

FRESH OYSTERS.
Frankfort Agency of Miles Celebrated
"52" OYSTERS.
We have commenced receiving, and will be constantly supplied with the above celebrated Oysters, throughout the season.
syds w&t-wlf W. H. KEENE & CO.

rocks in my carriage.
One Hundred Dollars Reward
 Will be paid upon conviction of the thief and return
 of the horse, if stolen; or a generous reward if he
 should have strayed. A. W. DUDLEY.
 dec13 t-wt1

Wanted.
 A GOOD family maid servant, used to dining-
 room and house work. E. W. MORGAN.
 dec22 t-wt1

heights about 30 or 35 pounds; light complexion; thin hair, very little if any beard; blue eyes; about 10 to 12 inches high; he is supposed to have come to the Carolina.

**A No. 1 Neg o Boy 12 Years
Old For Sale.**

PERSONS wishing to purchase, may call upon
THO. A. THEOBALD, in South Frankfort.
Angel wai-wai

This image shows a blank, aged, cream-colored page, likely an endpaper or flyleaf of a book. The paper has a slightly textured appearance with some minor discoloration and creases, characteristic of old paper. A small tear is visible near the bottom center of the page. The left edge shows the binding of the book, and the overall tone is warm and vintage.

